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BRIEFLY NOTED

an encroachment by "Big Brother-or perhaps in this case Big Sister.""6 He further contended that the majority opinion would reinforce the fear expressed by opponents of the Equal Rights Amendment of "extreme applications bordering
on the ridiculous when no
'8 7
meaningful discrimination exists.
For all its shortcomings, the Bundy decision represents a courageous attempt by a court to resolve some of the sexual inequities
in a female employee's work environment. Some commentators
may criticize Bundy for dealing with a complex human issue under
the guise of Title VII. Bundy, however, did not depart from precedent; it merely extended precedent to achieve a laudable result for
the Sandra Bundys of the world. The ultimate question is whether
the legal principle set forth in Bundy runs too far ahead of the
nation's social conscience.

Satz v. Perlmutter: A Constitutional Right to
Die?
Abe Perlmutter was a seventy-three year old patient, terminally ill. He sought judicial approval of his. decision to discontinue
extraordinary, life-sustaining medical treatment.1 Perlmutter suffered from amytrophic lateral sclerosis,' an incurable disease for
which the normal life expectancy following diagnosis is two years.
In his case, the disease had progressed to the point where he had
only a few months to live and could not breathe without the aid of
a mechanical respirator. Every movement caused him excruciating
36. Id. at 1033.
37. Id. at 1038.

1. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), afl'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla.
1980). Extraordinary treatment is commonly defined as "all medicines, treatments and operations which can't be obtained or used without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience, or which if used, would not offer a reasonable hope of benefit." Louisell, Euthanasia
and Biathanasia: On Dying and Killing, 20 CATH. U.L. REv. 723, 736 (1973); see In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 21, 355 A.2d 647, 668 (1976), in which the court noted that "one would
have to think that the use of the same respirator or life-support could be considered 'ordinary' in the context of the possibly curable patient but 'extraordinary' in the context of...
an irreversibly doomed patient."
2. Amytrophic lateral sclerosis, commonly known as Lou Gehrig's disease, is a degenerative disease of the neurological system, characterized by increasing paralysis. It inevitably

results in death within three years. See generally
MEDICINE 1834, 1845 (7th ed. 1974).
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pain, and he could speak only with extreme effort and discomfort.
Despite his deteriorated physical condition, Perlmutter was "competent and mentally aware of the nature and consequences of his
[actions]." Fully aware that removal of the respirator would reduce his already limited life expectancy to less than one hour,'
Perlmutter sought, with full approval from his adult family, to
have the mechanical respirator removed from his trachea.
The attending physicians, fearing possible civil and criminal
liability, refused to accede to Perlmutter's request that they discontinue medical treatment. Following their refusal, Perlmutter
filed a complaint in the Broward County Circuit Court, naming as
defendants the hospital, two doctors, and the state attorney. He
asked the court to allow him to determine whether to continue his
life with the mechanical respirator or to terminate it by natural
5
means.
The trial court concluded that the interests of the state and
the medical profession did not outweigh Perlmutter's right to decline further treatment. Accordingly, the court entered a final
judgment restraining the defendants from interfering with his decision to remove the respirator.6 On appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, affirmed the judgment of the trial court.7 On
certiorari, the Supreme.Court of Florida affirmed, expressly adopting the district court's holding that a competent adult patient who
suffers from a terminal illness and has no minor dependents has
the constitutional right to refuse or discontinue extraordinary
medical treatment when all affected family members consent.8
Recent advances in medical technology have raised serious
questions concerning the rights of terminally ill patients to refuse
medical treatment.' With the development of sophisticated, lifesustaining equipment, physicians have a greater measure of control
in artifically prolonging life. Prolonging life, however, may not al3. Perlmutter v. Florida Medical Center, 47 Fla. Supp. 190, 191 (Broward County Cir.
Ct. 1978).
4. Satz v. Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
5. 47 Fla. Supp. at 190.
6. Id. at 193.
7. 362 So. 2d at 160.
8. 379 So. 2d at 360.
9. See Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); Cantor, A Patient's Decision to Decline LifeSaving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity v. the Preservation of Life, 20 RUTGERS L.
REV. 228 (1973); Claypool, The Family Deals with Death, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 34 (1975);
Dworkin, Death in Context, 48 IND. L.J. 623 (1973); Foreman, The Physician's Criminal
Liability for the Practice of Euthanasia,27 BAYLOR L. REv. 54 (1975).
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ways be in the best interest of the patient. In some cases, the use
of extraordinary measures to avoid imminent death results in useless personal suffering by the patient and emotional and financial
burdens on the family.
Doctors with terminally ill patients who refuse to accept or to
continue extraordinary medical treatment face a Hobson's choice.
On the one hand, if they accede to the patient's wishes and withhold or discontinue life-sustaining services, they may violate prevailing medical ethical standards and expose themselves to potential civil and criminal liability. The doctors could face civil liability
under theories of medical malpractice, wrongful death, abandonment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress; their criminal liability could arise under the theory that the withholding or
discontinuing of treatment constitutes an unlawful killing of a
human being under the state's manslaughter 0 or murder statutes.11 On the other hand, if the physician's treatment is contrary
to the patient's wishes, the patient might sue the doctor for not
withholding treatment. Under the tort doctrine of "informed consent,"'" the patient might recover for the expenses incurred in prolonging his life, or for pain and suffering under such theories as
assault and battery, negligence, malpractice, intentional infliction
of emotional distress, breach of contract, or invasion of the patient's constitutional right to privacy." Faced with this dilemma,
many doctors and hospitals have turned to the courts for guidance
in determining when they may withhold or discontinue life-sustaining treatment at a patient's request.
4 the Supreme Court of Florida considIn Satz v.Perlmutter,1
ered for the first time the question whether a mentally competent,
terminally ill adult has a constitutional right to refuse medical
treatment. Answering the question in the affirmative, the supreme
10. FLA. STAT. § 782.07 (1979).
11. FLA. STAT. § 782.07 (1979). A doctor who accedes to his patient's request to discontinue essential health care may also be criminally liable for assisting self-murder under FLA.
STAT. § 782.08 (1979). See Akers, The Living Will: Already a PracticalAlternative, 55 TEx.
L. REV. 665, 670, 684 (1977).
12. Under the doctrine of informed consent, a physician may administer treatment to a
patient only if the physician gives the patient information about the material risks involved
in the treatment and the patient consents to have the treatment administered. The consent

must be competent, understanding, and voluntary; absent consent, the physician is liable,
even if the treatment is skillfully performed and benefits the patient. See

MEDICAL MAL-

PRACTICE: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY'S COMMISSION ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE

Pub. No. (OS) 73-88, Jan. 16, 1973).
13. Akers, supra note 11, at 677.
14. 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).

29 (DHEW
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court agreed with decisions of other state courts holding that the
constitutional right to privacy"5 is broad enough to encompass a
patient's decision to refuse or discontinue extraordinary medical
treatment. 6 The supreme court, however, expressly confined its
decision to the particular facts of the Perlmuttercase, noting that
the complex medical issues presented were more appropriate for
legislative action.17 Since the opinion of the Fourth District
touched on these issues and clarified the state interests involved in
a patient's right to die, the supreme court adopted that opinion as
its own. 8 To understand the Perlmutter decision, then, one must
examine the Fourth District's opinion.
Following the rationale of the Massachusetts case of Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz,' 9 the Fourth District carefully outlined the state's interests in preserving life, preventing suicide, protecting third parties from the adverse effects of a patient's
death, and maintaining the integrity of the medical profession.
The court concluded that these interests did not outweigh Perlmutter's right to refuse treatment. In discussing the interest of the
state in opposing an individual's decision to refuse extraordinary
medical treatment, the Fourth District agreed with the Saikewicz
court that "there is a substantial distinction in the State's insistence that human life be saved where the affliction is curable, as
opposed to the State interest, where, as here, the issue is not
whether, but when, for how long and at what cost to the individual
[his] life may be briefly extended." 0 In Perlmutter's case, his terminal disease left him only a few months to live, even if he were
kept on the respirator. His constitutional right to privacy, and the
corresponding right of self-determination, far outweighed the
state's interest in preserving life."
Closely related to the state's interest in preserving life is its
15. See cases cited note 9 supra. Although the Constitution does not explicitly mention
a right to privacy, several Supreme Court decisions have suggested that the constitutional
right to privacy exists in the penumbra of specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, emanating from those guarantees and giving them life and substance. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 484 (1965). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
16. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977); In re
Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); In re Osborne, 294 A.2d 372 (D.C. App. 1972).
17. 379 So. 2d at 360.
18. Id.
19. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
20. 362 So. 2d at 162 (quoting Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
at 425-26) (brackets used by Fourth District in Satz v. Perlmutter).
21. Id. at 163.
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interest in preventing suicide-the irrational destruction of life. 22
To a large extent, this social goal merely reaffirms the state's interest in preserving life. But the Fourth District reasoned that Perlmutter's "basic wish to live, plus the fact that he did not self-induce his horrible affliction,. precludes his further refusal of
treatment being classified as attempted suicide."2 s In reaching this
conclusion, the district court relied on analagous situations involving cancer-ridden patients who decline surgery or chemotherapy
necessary for their temporary survival. Although Perlmutter's predicament appeared more drastic because disconnection of the respirator required an affirmative act, the principle was the same as
when a patient refuses to institute life-saving treatment at the outset of an illness. In both situations, the patient chooses not to suffer an expensive course of medical treatment that may keep him
alive without restoring his health.The Fourth District reasoned
that because Perlmutter had the right to refuse treatment in the
first instance, he had a concomitant right to discontinue it, and his
24
exercise of that right was not an attempted suicide.
Although a state may have a valid interest in protecting third
parties, particularly minor children, from the emotional and
financial impact of a refusal to accept treatment, that interest usually arises in the context of religious objections to blood transfusions. 25 In that situation, a patient's refusal to accept life-saving
blood might have the effect of abandoning the patient's minor children, making them wards of the state. The Fourth District concluded that, in Perlmutter's case, the state interest in protecting
minors was inapplicable since all his children were adults who concurred in his decision to disconnect the respirator.26 Arguably, the
state's interest in protecting third parties has little application to a
terminally ill patient whose death is imminent, regardless of lifesaving treatment. The principal rationale behind the state interest
loses its significance when medical treatment provides only brief
respite before the patient dies, leaving his children or other third
persons in the same position as if treatment had been withheld.
The only real difference between administering and withholding
22. 370 N.E.2d at 426 n.11.

23. 362 So. 2d at 163.
24. Id.
25. In re President of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, rehearing en banc denied, 331 F.2d 1010 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964); United States v. George,
239 F. Supp. 752 (D. Conn. 1965) (adopting the rationale of In re President of Georgetown
College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000).
26. 362 So. 2d at 162.
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treatment is that the patient forced to undergo treatment must
spend more money merely to prolong his life, money that could
have helped to provide for his minor children.
Finally, the Fourth District discussed the state's interest in
preserving the integrity of the medical profession. In our society,
physicians bear the responsibility of determining the nature, extent, and duration of medical treatment.27 Prevailing medical practices, standards, and ethics guide their conduct in this regard. The
recent development of extraordinary life-sustaining techniques has
caused considerable controversy within the medical profession
about the proper role of the health care professional in cases of
terminal illness. 28 Before the development of such techniques, physicians considered it their duty to make every conceivable effort to
prolong life2 9 But advanced technology brought with it the realization that the effect of prolonging life is often to "prolong suffering,
isolate the family from their loved ones

. . .

or result in economic

ruin for the family."80 Many physicians began to see the distinction between curing the ill and comforting the dying. For example,
one medical commentator stated that:
we should not use extraordinarymeans of prolonging life or its
semblance when, after careful consideration, consultation and
the application of the most well-conceived therapy, it becomes
apparent that there is no hope for the recovery of the patient.
Recovery should not be defined simply as the ability to remain
alive; it should mean life without intolerable suffering.3 1
In Perlmutter, the Fourth District adopted the language of
Saikewicz, noting that the interest of doctors and hospitals in using all available means to combat disease is mitigated by modern
ethical standards:
Prevailing medical ethical practice does not, without exception,
demand that all efforts towards life prolongation be made ....
Rather, .

.

. the prevailing ethical practice seems to be to recog-

nize that the dying are more often in need of comfort than treatment. Recognition of the right to refuse necessary treatment in
appropriate circumstances is consistent with existing medical
mores; such a doctrine does not threaten either the integrity of
27. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 46-47, 355 A.2d 647, 667 (1976).
28. See In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 46-47 n.8, 355 A.2d at 667 n.8 and articles cited therein.
29. Superintendent of Belchertown v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 423.
30. Id. (quoting Lewis, Machine Medicine and Its Relation to the Fatally Ill, 206

J.A.M.A. 387 (1968)).
31. Id. (quoting Lewis, supra note 30, at 391).
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the medical profession, the proper role of hospitals in caring for
such patients or the State's interest in protecting the same.."

Since the doctrines of informed consent and the constitutional
right of privacy8 8 derive from the individual's right of bodily integ-

rity and self-determination, they outweigh any institutional considerations that favor prolonging life through the exhaustive use of
medical technology. s
The Fourth District concluded that no state interest or combination of interests was great enough to overcome the right of the
terminally ill patient to refuse life-sustaining treatment.3

court noted that although it was "very

convenient"8 "

5

The

to insist on

continuing Perlmutter's life to avoid any question of misconduct,
or civil or criminal liability, or any affront to medical standards, to

do so against Perlmutter's will and at great expense and pain to
him, would impermissibly violate his constitutional rights.
7 on the law of Florida is
The impact of Satz v. Perlmutter8
still uncertain. Although the supreme court recognized that the

constitutional right to privacy encompasses a patient's decision to
refuse or discontinue medical treatment in appropriate circumas
stances, it expressly limited its holding to the facts before it.
Thus, despite "over a dozen legislative failures in this state to

adopt suitable legislation in this field,"'" the supreme court ig-

nored impassioned pleas from counsel for the decedent and the
physicians that the issue was one that cried "out for judicial resolution in a comprehensive manner so that physicians, public offi-

citizens of the state may be guided in
cials, hospitals and other
40
their future conduct.
In expressly refusing to resolve the conflict, the court noted
that
32. 362 So. 2d at 163, 370 N.E.2d at 426-27 (quoting Saikewicz).
33. See notes 12 & 15 supra.
34. 362 So. 2d at 163-64.
35. Id. at 163.
36. Id. at 164.
37. 362 So. 2d 160 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978), aff'd, 379 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 1980).
38. 379 So. 2d at 361.
39. 362 So. 2d at 164. The most recent failure of the legislature to adopt suitable legislation in this field occurred during the 1980 session of the Florida Legislature, several
months after the court announced its decision in Satz v. Perlmutter. The "death with dignity" bill that failed to pass the Legislature during the 1980 session should not be confused
with FLA. STAT. § 382.085 (Supp. 1980), which provides a non-exclusive definition of death:
"the irreversible cessation of the functioning of the entire brain, including the brain stem."
40. 379 So. 2d at 360.
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the issue . . .is fraught with complexity and encompasses the
interests of law, both civil and criminal, medical ethics and social morality, [and] it is not one which is well suited for resolution in an adversary judicial proceeding. It is the type [of] issue
which is more suitably addressed in the legislative forum, where
fact finding can be less confined and the viewpoint of all interested institutions and discipline can be presented and
synthesized. "1
Although it may be correct to conclude that the issue is appropriate for legislative resolution, the supreme court itself has noted
elsewhere that "in the absence of appropriate legislative action [to
provide the ways and means of enforcing constitutional rights] it is
the responsibility of the courts to do so."''4 Thus, in light of the
failure of the Florida Legislature to enact right-to-die legislation,
the supreme court could have and should have promulgated guidelines for physicians and hospitals to follow in future situations like
Perlmutter's. A judicial rule, rather than a case-by-case approach,
would have avoided the practical effect of Perlmutter which will
require physicians and hospitals to seek judicial approval each
time a patient refuses to continue life-saving treatment-or face
potential civil and criminal liability if the decendent's estate or the
state attorney later disagrees with the physician's response to his
patient's request.
JOSEPH

D.

WASIL

The Right to Counsel in Child Dependency
Proceedings: Conflict Between Florida and

the Fifth Circuit
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently handed down a decision in direct conflict with a decision
made by the Supreme Court of Florida only ten months earlier. In
Davis v.Page' the Fifth Circuit held that indigent parents have an
41. Id.
42. Dade County Classroom Teachers Ass'n. v. Legislature, 269 So. 2d 684, 686 (Fla.
1972).

1. No. 78-2063 (5th Cir. Mar. 23, 1980). Davis filed a petition for a writ of habeas

corpus in the Supreme Court of Florida to regain custody of her child from the State De-

